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The ability to identify the emotions of others is a key component of what is known as
social cognition. Narratives exploit this mechanism to create an emotional bond with
the characters and to maintain the engagement of the audience throughout the story. In
this paper, we illustrate a case study in emotion understanding in stories that exploits a
computational agent to explore emotion impairment in a group of traumatic brain injured
people. The study focuses on moral emotions, aiming to investigate the differences in
moral functioning that characterize traumatic brain injured patients. After comparing the
understanding of themoral and emotional facets of the agent’s behavior in traumatic brain
injured patients and in neurologically intact controls, slight–yet meaningful–differences
were observed between the two groups. We describe the test methodology and results,
highlighting their implications for the design of rehabilitation applications based on
virtual agents.
Keywords: narrative, emotion understanding, moral emotions, social cognition, traumatic brain injury,
computational models, models of emotion
1. INTRODUCTION
Emotions play a crucial role in stories, as stated by scholars for centuries, from philosophy
(Aristotle, 2013) and psychology (Bruner, 1991) to narratology (Giovannelli, 2009). In Plato’s
Ion, the rhapsode Ion describes his ability to evoke emotional states in the audience: “For I look
down upon them [the spectators] from the stage and behold the various emotions of pity, wonder,
sternness stamped upon their countenances when I am speaking.” (Plato and Jowett, 1924 as cited
in Damiano et al., 2019). In narratives, emotions, and moral emotions in particular, take a leading
role in engaging the audience, ensuring their involvement throughout the plot, from rise to climax
to resolution (Olson, 1961; Giovannelli, 2009).
The ability to read and understand the emotions of characters is crucial to grasping the meaning
of a story. Such ability relies on what is known as social cognition. Social cognition (Cassel et al.,
2019) is an umbrella term indicating a set of processes from the ability to read social cues both
from the self and from others and understanding emotions, beliefs, and behavior to the capability
of generating appropriate responses to social cues. Traumatic brain injuries (here TBI), like other
neurological conditions, lead to impairments in social cognition (Bibby and McDonald, 2005) as
well as in controlling behavior and properly displaying emotions (Roberts et al., 2019).
Several studies point toward a relationship between social cognition and social behavior
following TBI (Milders, 2019). Although addressing social impairments is a fundamental step
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toward full recovery (Kelly et al., 2017), testing tools for social
cognition after TBI are often underutilized in clinical practice
(Kelly et al., 2017).
Here, we investigate the perception of emotions in narrative
scenarios by TBI individuals involved in effective cognitive
rehabilitation but yet impaired, to some extent, in their moral
and emotional functioning (i.e., inability to empathize, difficulties
in understanding their own emotions, etc.). More specifically,
we focus on the understanding of narrative situations involving
moral emotions. In fact, authors have claimed that moral
impairments following TBI should gain more attention in
research (McDonald, 2013), as moral capabilities greatly affect
the quality of life of patients and of their caregivers (Saint-
Jean et al., 2019). The use of narrative scenarios is two-fold: on
the one side, thanks to the universally acknowledged capability
of narrative to convey values in a compact and effective form
for human cognition (Bruner, 1991), they represent a suitable
format for presenting moral dilemmas to the patients; on the
other side, these scenarios can afford the creation of applications
for training and rehabilitation that prompt the patients to
reason about the emotions of characters in fictional stories. Our
work leverages a computational agent model to explore the
difference in the understanding of moral actions and emotions
in narrative scenarios among TBI patients and neurologically
intact individuals.
Aimed at generating human-like, believable behaviors,
computational agents rely on cognitively inspired architectures
where emotions and deliberation affect each other to replicate
the complex interaction of rational and emotional components in
humans (Marsella et al., 2010; Lisetti and Hudlicka, 2014). Since
the output of the agent can be compared with the predictions of
the audience about what the character will feel and do, virtual
agents provide a stable, verifiable framework for the design and
the implementation of experiments in story understanding.
In addition, the agent can afford the design of characters who
behave and feel according to specific psychological theories or
can be set to standard functioning to support the creation of
rehabilitation applications (Habonneau et al., 2012; Chauveau
et al., 2018).
In order to study the moral emotional impairment of TBI
patients through stories, this study employs narrative scenarios
whose characters are replaced by a computational agent that
encompasses moral values and emotions, the Moral Emotional
Agent orMEA (Battaglino et al., 2013).
Our methodology, previously sketched in Ceccaldi
et al. (2016), is aimed at comparing the differences in the
understanding of emotions, focusing on moral emotions
between traumatic brain injured patients and neurologically
intact controls. Drawing from the experiments described by
Battaglino and Damiano (2014a), where the emotions generated
by the agent were compared with the emotions ascribed to
the narrative character by the human users, we compare the
emotions generated by the agent with those identified by the
test and control groups to investigate the differences between
the two groups. The results confirm the role of emotions in
the understanding of narratives and highlight the impairment
of TBI patients in the understanding of moral emotions. The
advantage of our approach is two-fold: on the one side, new
testing scenarios can be easily generated by submitting new plots
to the computational agent; on the other side, the agent can
be straightforwardly employed to implement virtual characters
to train the patients through stories. Differently from abstract
dilemmas, stories possess the unique quality of engaging the
audience, and this provides a natural candidate for creating
effective training tools. This is also in line with the use of virtual
characters in applications for health care and medicine, where
the affective dimension has been recognized as a main requisite
for establishing successful and effective relationships with the
patients (Calvo et al., 2014).
1.1. Related Work
Behavioral consequences of traumatic brain injury can be a
greater burden for caregivers of brain damaged individuals
than physical consequences of the injury (Bornhofen and
Mcdonald, 2008). Despite being relatively well documented, the
impairments underlying the negative social outcomes occurring
after TBI are far from being fully understood (Milders et al.,
2008). Moreover, there is currently a lack of diagnostic tools
to assess the changes in social behavior and cognition (Cattran
et al., 2016). The tools proposed in the literature have addressed
several aspects of this area while also leveraging different testing
tools and methodologies, such as emotion recognition (in terms
of facial expressions), theory of mind, sensitivity to social cues,
complex language (inference, humor), empathy, understanding
of paralinguistic cues, social interaction and social anxiety
(Cattran et al., 2016). A thorough review of testing tools for
social cognition after TBI goes beyond the scope of this study.
Most used testing methodologies have been recently described by
Milders (2019). Nonetheless, works on emotion understanding
in stories might help the reader better fathom our study on
narrative scenarios. The Emotional Inferencing From Story
(EIST) proposed by Neumann et al. (2015) assesses the ability
to understand emotions of others from contextual cues. The
purpose is to measure emotion understanding when non-verbal
cues are unavailable; to do this, patients were presented with short
stories and asked to evaluate how the character in that story was
feeling. When compared with neurologically intact individuals,
TBI participants scored significantly lower, showing EIST validity
in assessing impairments following TBI. Similarly, Saint-Jean
et al. (2019) illustrate how social cognition deficits in TBI
patients can be effectively assessed through narrative scenarios.
For instance, they describe the social problem solving task, a test
made up of 10 written stories depicting a character facing a social
problem. In the test, participants had to detect and understand
the problem and to identify its key components. Furthermore,
the task required them to propose solutions to the problem or
to evaluate solutions that were already presented in the scenario.
Patients scored significantly lower than healthy controls in the
social problem task.What is more, when it comes to training such
ability to understand the emotional content of stories, research
has shown that it did positively impact social behavior according
to caregivers’ ratings (Radice-Neumann et al., 2009). Radice-
Neumann et al. trained TBI patients to infer emotions from
contextual cues portrayed in stories, and to make connections
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between these stories and personal events. The training relied on
short stories; while reading the scenarios, participants also had to
take contextual cues of emotional features (i.e., characters’ wants,
expectations, and behavior) into account and relate the story
to personal lives. After reading each scenario, participants were
asked to select the strongest emotion they believed the character
was feeling. Feedback was given for incorrect responses. When
the correct option was provided, participants were asked why it
was correct, how they would have felt in that situation, if they
ever found themselves in similar circumstance and to state a life
event that had made them experience that emotion. The training
resulted in participants beingmore comfortable in reporting their
emotions and better able to handle their emotions in challenging
situations. Caregivers of participants reported improvements in
attitude and ability to communicate feelings.
2. MODELING STORY CHARACTERS WITH
THE MEA AGENT
In the last decade, the use of virtual agents in health care has been
explored in different domains, spanning from nursing (Bickmore
et al., 2012) and counseling (LeRouge et al., 2015) to training
of people with autism (Burke et al., 2018) and assistance to
elderly and cognitively impaired people (Yaghoubzadeh et al.,
2013; Chauveau et al., 2018). Virtual agents can be implemented
on different devices in an non intrusive way, thus guaranteeing
portability and continuity in therapies, and can be personalized
to meet the needs of specific patients or groups of patients. In
particular, the integration of an affective component in virtual
agents has attracted the attention of scholars, since it opens to the
creation of empathetic virtual agents, more natural and believable
in the interaction with the user (Lisetti and Hudlicka, 2014).
2.1. The MEA Model
The core reference model for creating virtual agents is provided
by the widely acknowledged Belief Desire Intention (BDI) model
(Bratman, 1987; Cohen and Levesque, 1990). The BDI model,
informed on Dennet’s notion of “intentional stance” (Dennett,
1987), is suitable to simulate the intentions behind the behavior
of human agents, and as such can be effectively employed to
create virtual agents that interact with human users. Following
this model, the MEA agent (Battaglino et al., 2013) features a set
of goals, or desires, composing the motivational component of
the agent; the beliefs of the agent are formed by a representation
of the world, continuously updated through perception, and by
the knowledge about how actions can be planned and executed in
the world to achieve the agent’s goals; the agent’s commitment to
execute action plans bridges the gap between the agent’s abstract
goals and its practical intentions. The MEA model integrates in
the BDI model an emotional component based on the cognitive
theory of emotions proposed by Ortony et al. (1988) (here OCC).
In MEA, a goal is associated with an importance of success and an
importance of failure, and with three different set of conditions:
adoption conditions, success conditions, and failure conditions. A
goal becomes an active intention when the agent believes that
one of the adoption conditions of a goal is true in the world;
at this point, the agent starts the deliberation phase, trying to
find plans to achieve the goal’s success conditions and dropping
those that have been achieved or whose failure conditions have
become true. Psychology shows that decision-making relies on
preferences that vary with the subjective utilities of anticipated
outcomes, weighted by their probabilities (Angie et al., 2011)
and that decision-making and moral judgment are related to
how people combine desires, personal values, and expectation
to choose a course of action. So, the agent, after devising a
set of plans to achieve its goals, ranks them by combining the
achievement of goals (measured through their importance of
success and the importance of failure) with a measure of its own
emotional well-being (Expected Emotional Reward, EER) and
becomes committed to the plan with the best trade-off between
positive and negative emotions, then starts to execute it. After
monitoring the effects of the execution on the state of the world
(the plan might have succeeded or not, other events may have
occurred), the agent eventually updates its beliefs and emotional
state accordingly.
A characterizing feature of the MEA model is given by the
explicit acknowledgement of values in the appraisal of emotions.
Values (or “standards” in OCC terms) are the moral drive of the
agent (Fraassen, 1973; Dehghani et al., 2008), which binds its
behavior to a moral dimension and enables it to morally appraise
the behavior of self and others, thus eliciting moral emotions.
In the MEA agent, each value holds a priority that indicates
the importance of the value for the agent, and a set violation
conditions. When one of the violation conditions of a value is true
in the state of the world, the value is at stake and will originate a
goal to bring it back to balance. In the reasoning cycle of MEA,
the appraisal of emotions occurs twice: the first time, during the
deliberation phase (Anticipatory Emotional Appraisal), to assess
the consequences of the agent’s options on the agent’s emotional
state; the second time, after assessing the changes occurred in the
world (Emotional Appraisal phase), to generate the agent’s actual
emotional state, according to the following schema:
1. Value Monitoring: If the agent believes the condition of a
value to be true in the current situation, then the value is
at stake.
2. Goal Formation: Goals whose adoption conditions hold in
the belief base are adopted and become active intentions; they
include value-based goals, motivated by the values at stake.
3. Emotional Anticipatory Appraisal: After computing the
expected emotional reward (EER) of every goal from its
associated plans, the agent chooses the optimal plan; in this
phase, the agent “feels” only anticipatory emotions.
4. Execution: The agent starts the execution of the next action of
the chosen plan.
5. Monitoring: The agent appraises the world and updates her
beliefs about it, including the status of its goals and values.
6. Emotional Appraisal: depending on the updates observed in
the state of the world (goals achieved or failed and values
re-established or at stake) the agent feels certain emotions.
Consider, for instance, an agent who desires a chocolate treat, but
hasn’t got one. Having learnt that another agent has a chocolate
candy (adoption condition), the goal to eat the chocolate candy
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becomes the agent’s active intention (Goal formation). So,
the agent starts planning how to achieve her goal, eventually
devising two plans: asking the other agent to give her the candy,
or stealing the candy. The agent appraises the effect of each
plan on her goals and values, and ranks the plans according
to their expected emotional reward (Emotional Anticipatory
Appraisal). Depending on the goal and value structure of the
agent (whether she is inclined to follow the rules, optimistic
about others, etc.), the ranking of plans will vary. Eventually,
the agent selects a plan and executes it (Execution), monitors its
effects (Monitoring) and feels emotions based on its outcome:
gratitude, anger, disappointment, satisfaction, etc. (Emotional
Appraisal). When the reasoning cycle starts again, the agent
might realize one of her values to be at stake (Value Monitoring):
for example, because she has put at stake her honesty due to her
desire for chocolate.
2.2. Emotional Appraisal in MEA
The reference theory of emotions in the MEA agent is the OCC
theory (Ortony et al., 1988), chosen for its capability to match the
emotional range of characters in the perception of the audience
(Lombardo et al., 2015). In the OCC model, events are appraised
based on the their desirability for the agent’s goal, self, and
others’ actions are appraised based on their compliance with the
agent’s moral standards, objects are appraised based on the agent’s
specific attitudes toward them.
Following the general framework established by Gratch and
Marsella (2004), the generation of the emotional states in MEA is
a two-step process:
First, the appraisal generates a set of appraisal variables, such
as the desirability and probability of an event, each associated
with some intensity; in the affect derivation process, emotional
states are activated based on the appraisal variables. In practice,
when an agent’s goal is achieved (or not achieved), the appraisal
process generates a desirability variable (or an undesirability
variable); when an agent’s value is put at stake (or brought back
to balance) by the execution of some action, the appraisal process
generates a blameworthiness (or praiseworthiness) variable; the
probability that an event occurs or that a agent’s plan succeeds
generates a likelihood variable. Based on the appraisal variables,
the affect generation process generates emotions according to the
following rules (see Figure 1):
• Joy (or Distress) if a desirable (or undesirable) appraisal
variable is generated;
• Pride (or Shame) if praiseworthy (or blameworthy) appraisal
variable is generated and the responsibility is self-caused;
• Admiration (or Reproach) if praiseworthy (blameworthy)
appraisal variable is generated and the responsibility is
other-caused.
When the same situation is appraised as both an action and
a non-intentional event, appraisal variables for both values
and goals are generated, thus eliciting compound emotions:
Gratification (Joy and Pride), Gratitude (Joy and Admiration),
Remorse (Distress and Self-Reproach), Anger (Distress and
Reproach). If a likelihood appraisal variable has a high (or
low) value, Hope (or Fear) are generated. The intensity of
emotions depends on the multiplicative relationship between the
importance of values and goals, the effort (i.e., the length of the
plan) and the probability of success of the plan.
As a consequence of the anticipatory emotional appraisal, the
behavior of the agent is compelled by its moral values through
anticipatory emotions, a feature that makes it especially suitable
to model moral dilemmas in stories (Williams, 2006), where
introspection plays a prominent role. Also, the agent model
guarantees that the dynamics of the agent’s deliberative and
emotional processes can be traced and exposed to the users, in
line with the requisite of transparency and explainability required
by the principles of trustworthy AI 1.
For example, consider again the agent who desires chocolate,
but can only steal it from another agent or ask for it. Assuming
that stealing puts the agent’s honesty at stake, the agent’s behavior
depends on the anticipatory emotional appraisal: if honesty is
of minimal importance for the agent (i.e., it has a low priority),
negative emotions such as the shame generated by the act of
stealing, or the fear to fail a risky plan, will be largely compensated
by the satisfaction of eating the candy, and agent will end up
stealing; on the contrary, if honesty is very important for the
agent (i.e., it has a high priority), the expectation of shame will
retain her from stealing, unless she is really hungry. Notice that
even if the agent eventually decides to steal, this won’t stop
her to feel shame, possibly with a low intensity, and mixed
with satisfaction or disappointment depending on whether she
actually obtained the chocolate candy.
2.3. Validating the MEA Model
In order to validate the MEA model, Battaglino and Damiano
compared the behavior and the emotions generated by the
MEA agent with the predictions of human participants in a
set of narrative scenarios (Battaglino and Damiano, 2014a,b).
Following the suggestions of a drama expert, the scenarios for
both experiments were taken from well-known literary works,
thus lifting the experiment design from the task of inventing new
and potentially controversial narrative situations. The original
experiments included two tests, structured as simple games. The
Actor Studio (Battaglino and Damiano, 2014a) test was designed
to validate the role of emotions in the agent’s deliberation: given
the character’s scale of moral values, participants were asked
what course of action the character would choose, and what
emotions she/he would feel, as if they were practising at the
well-known “Actor’s Studio” following the Stanislavski’s acting
method. In order to bypass the participants’ previous knowledge
of the literary works, the scenarios were re-written with different
characters and actions but keeping the interplay of characters’
goals and values unmodified. The test included 3 narrative
scenarios (see Appendix 1.1) where the main character’s options
(plans in agent’s terms) were generated by the MEA agent given
the character’s goals and values (see section 2.1). After receiving
a description of the character’s goals and values, each participant
was asked to choose the most suitable option for the character.
1https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/commission-white-paper-artificial-
intelligence-feb2020_en.pdf
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FIGURE 1 | Emotional appraisal and affect generation in the MEA model. Other appraisal variables (importance of goals, priority of values and plan length) do not
determine the affect type, but only the intensity, and are not represented in the figure.
The Audience Studio (Battaglino and Damiano, 2014b) test
was aimed at validating the interplay of values and emotions in
the agent: all participants were exposed to the same characters’
behavior with two different conditions—with and without moral
emotions—and had to assess their adequacy, as if they were
assessing the performance of actors interpreting the characters.
The test included 4 narrative scenarios (see Appendix 1.2)
where the main characters were implemented by the MEA agent
(Battaglino et al., 2013; Cristina, 2015). Differently from the Actor
Studio, where alternative options were generated to create the
user choices, in this test only the actual behavior of the character
in the literary work was generated, with and without value-based
emotions. Since the participants’ knowledge of the characters’
actions was not relevant here, the original characters and actions
were maintained.
The results, discussed in Battaglino and Damiano (2014a,b),
showed that the expectations of the testers matched the
predictions of the model: for the Actor Studio, the participants
attributed to the character the course of behavior and the
emotions predicted by the model (Battaglino and Damiano,
2014a); for the Audience Studio, the emotional states including
moral emotions were evaluated as more complete and believable
(Battaglino and Damiano, 2014a,b).
3. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY
In this study, both tests described in Battaglino and Damiano
(2014a) were used to explore emotion understanding in narrative
in TBI patients. In previous studies, the expectations of
neurologically intact individuals on characters’ behavior and
emotions have been demonstrated to match predictions made by
modeling characters as MEA agents (Battaglino and Damiano,
2014a,b). Therefore, this study could leverage such testing tools
to compare MEA agents’ behavior and emotions with TBI
participants’ expectations and predictions.
3.1. Participants
The clinical sample was recruited from “Puzzle" rehabilitation
center in Turin (Italy)2.
The clinical sample was made up of 14 TBI individuals
(mean age 40.3), involved in neuropsychological rehabilitation
at the center from 1 to 13 years (mean 5.5). Being in its
exploratory phase, our study involved an heterogeneous sample,
with participants having different cognitive profiles and clinical
histories, with lesions being localized mostly (but not exclusively)
in the frontal area. However, they were all recruited according
to their ability to execute the testing procedures, to read and to
verbally understand the scenarios thoroughly, along with having
difficulties in social cognition (e.g., emotion understanding,
empathy). In fact, only the patients that were deemed able to
complete the tasks by the center neuropsychologists were invited
to participate. Moreover, prior the experiment, each participant
had the possibility to familiarize with the experimenter and
with the testing procedure, to avoid stress and discomfort. As
completing the task required full recovery of specific cognitive
abilities (i.e., linguistic and narrative abilities to read and
understand the plot), recruiting participant was challenging,
resulting in a small sample. Before starting the tests, two TBI
patients with a cognitive profile similar to that of participants
took part in the study in order to test if their cognitive
2Puzzle rehabilitation center is an Italian leading facility for neuropsychological
recovery after traumatic brain-injury (www.centropuzzle.org/).
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impairments (i.e., reading difficulties, attention deficits) would
result in the task being too difficult or impossible to complete.
Secondly, themethodologies were slightly adapted to the needs of
the participants; for example they were made shorter (as patients
were very slow in reading, often taking longer than 60minutes for
each test). After this, the Actor Studio and the Audience Studio
testing methodologies were presented to a new sample made
of TBI patients and healthy controls, in order to compare the
groups. The control group was a convenience sample including
neurologically intact individuals (i.e., people that declared to the
experimenters never suffering from TBI), matching each patient
for age and gender.
3.2. Actor Studio Testing Methodology
The experiments were conducted online. For each scenario (see
Appendix 1.1), a short text introduced the character and her/his
values, then the narrative situation was illustrated. Figure 2
shows a screenshot of the page in which the narrative scenario
is illustrated. The character’s scale of values was presented to
the participant not in a numerical format, but with a figurative
scale, in order to make the priorities of the values as clear
and understandable as possible. The task of identifying the
expected course of action and emotions for the character was
presented to the participants as a game: participants were asked
to pretend they were practicing identification in an acting class,
trying to adopt the point of view of the characters as actors
following the Stanislavski’s acting method. By pressing the “play”
button (bottom of the page, Figure 2), the two alternative actions
generated by the MEA agent were presented to the participant,
who then had to indicate a set of possible emotions (taken from
the set of the 12 emotion types included in the MEA model,
see section 2.2).
3.3. Audience Studio Testing Methodology
The experiment was conducted online. It was made up of
the 4 narrative scenarios illustrated in Appendix 1.2, taken
from well-known literary works (namely Hamlet, The Count of
Montecristo, Thérèse Raquin, and The Vicomte of Bragelonne).
After a brief description of the narrative situation, participants
were presented with a dialogue between the characters involved
in the scenario. The dialogues were extracted from movies or
books for more immediacy. After this, characters’ emotions were
described through text labels (e.g., “Hamlet feels reproach toward
Ophelia”). Participants were then asked to select, from a list,
those emotions they would feel in a similar situation (again,
the set of 12 emotions from OCC model). Differently from the
Actor Studio, subjects had to evaluate both the emotions of
the protagonist and of the other character. Whereas, the Actor
Studio testing methodology allowed scores for each scenario to
be related to the same participant, the results for the Audience
Studio methodology could only be measured separately for
each scenario. Although simplified to meet the needs of TBI
patients, the Audience Studio testing procedure took more time
than the Actor Studio to be completed. Scenarios are in fact
longer to be read and understood and the testing procedure
also contains items we eventually decided not to take into
account (e.g., the participants’ evaluation of the characters’
attitude and behavior). For this reason, TBI participants were
sometimes unable to complete the testing procedure all at
once, as their daily schedule in the rehabilitation center only
allowed them to participate in the testing for about 45–50 min.
Therefore, some participants completed the test through several
sessions, resulting in scores being impossible to be related to
the same participant. Regrettably, the system did not record the
experiment time, thus causing sessions taking place on the same
day to be indistinguishable.
By contrast, the Actor Studio methodology required the
participants to choose a nickname for their performance. This,
along with the testing procedure being simpler and therefore
shorter, allowed every single session data to be related to its tester
and with the right scenario. The aforementioned characteristics
of the testing methodologies allowed us to compare scores
between groups for both methodologies, but a deeper analysis
of the scores and of their correlation with the clinical data was
possible only for the Actor Studio test.
4. MEASURES AND RESULTS
This section illustrates the measures employed to compare the
performance of the two groups along with the results, discussed
in section 5.
4.1. Measures
Data were analyzed through SPSS Statistics 24 (IBM). Sample size
was n = 13 for TBI patients and n = 11 for the control group
(as a consequence of participants drop-out). One neurologically
intact participant was not included in the analysis, as his scores
were significantly lower than other participants’ (i.e., Action score
and Emotion total score both for moral and non moral emotions
being equal to 0). Participants’ responses were turned into scores
in order to perform comparisons between groups. As mentioned
before, for the Audience Studio methodology only, scores were
measured separately for each scenario.
For both methodologies, scores were calculated as follows:
• Emotion total score (ETS): score = 1 each time participants
would choose the same emotion predicted by the MEAmodel;
• Moral emotion score (MES): score = 1 each time participants
would choose the same emotion predicted by the MEAmodel;
only for moral emotions, being them admiration, contempt,
gratification, gratitude, pride, shame, anger, blame;
• Non moral emotion score (N-MES): score = 1 each time
participants would choose the same emotion predicted by the
MEA model; only for non moral emotions, being them joy,
sadness, hope, and fear;
• Error total score (ERTS): score = 1 each time participants both
would choose an emotion in disagreement with MEA model
and would miss indicating those predicted by the model;
• Moral emotion error score (MERS): score = 1 each time
participants both would choose an emotion in disagreement
with MEA model and would miss indicating those predicted
by the model; only for moral emotions;
• Non moral emotion score (N-MERS): score=1 each time
participants both would choose an emotion in disagreement
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FIGURE 2 | The screenshot of the online interface of the Actor Studio test (in Italian).
with MEA model or would miss indicating those predicted by
the model, only for non moral emotions.
In the Actor Studio, participants were asked to predict the
action characters would choose according to their moral values.
Therefore, for this methodology only, we took a further measure
into account:
• Action total score (ATS): score=1 each time participants could
guess the agents’ action according to MEA model.
For each score, means were compared using Mann–Whitney
test, suitable for different-sized samples. As our aim was to
compare TBI participants’ similarity with the MEA agents with
that of neurologically intact individuals, we also used the Simple
Matching Coefficient statistic to evaluate the performance of
the participants (Sokal and Sneath, 1961). In our view, this
statistic allows a better comparison between the model and the
participants’ choices, as it takes into account also the emotions
not predicted by the model, and those not selected by the
participants. Considering theMEAModel emotion set as an array
of emotions (some included and some not) and the participants
choices as an array of selected and unselected emotions, the
Simple Matching Coefficient (SMC) was calculated as follows:
SMC =
M00 +M11
M00 +M01 +M10 +M11
(1)
Where:
• M00 are the emotions not predicted by the model and not
selected by the participant;
• M11 are the emotions predicted by the model and selected by
the participant;
• M01 are the emotions not predicted by the model selected by
the participant;
• M10 are the emotions predicted by the model not selected by
the participant.
After this, SMCs for each scenario were compared between
groups for both methodologies, through Mann–Whitney. We
measured global SMCs, calculated on complete emotion sets and
moral SMCs, considering moral emotions only. Furthermore,
we performed Spearman correlation analysis to assess the
relationship between time spent in the rehabilitation center
(rehabilitation duration, in years) and the global Simple
Matching Coefficient for the Actor Studio methodology,
calculated on all three scenarios. Moreover, we investigated the
relation between the time distance from the traumatic event (in
years) and the aforementioned variable.
4.2. Results
4.2.1. Results Actor
In the Actor Studio, participants were asked to select which
among two alternative courses of action the characters in
each scenario would choose, according to their moral values.
Percentages for action choice for TBI and healthy controls
are shown in Table 1. The X indicates the course of action
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TABLE 1 | Actor studio: percentages for action choice.
Scenario Plan MEA TBI (%) Controls (%)
1. Wallace
giving_key X 46.2 18.2
refusing_key – 53.8 81.8
2. At school!
revenging X 84.6 81.8
letting_go – 15.4 18.2
3. A difficult choice
staying X 84.6 81.8
leaving – 15.4 18.2
TABLE 2 | Actor studio: percentages for emotion choice.
Wallace At school! A difficult choice
Emotion M TBI (%) C (%) M TBI C (%) M TBI (%) C
Distress – 38.5 9.1 – 23.1 – X 23.1 18.2
Joy – 23.1 – X 23.1 36.4 X 76.9 54.5
Fear – – – – 46.2 54.5 – 23.1 9.1
Hope – 15.4 18.2 – – – – 30.8 9.1
Pride – 23.1 9.1 X 23.1 27.3 – 38.5 36.4
Shame X 23.1 27.3 X 23.1 18.2 X 23.1 18.2
Admiration – 23.1 27.3 – 7.7 – – 30.8 18.2
Reproach – 7.7 27.3 – 53.8 36.4 – 7.7 9.1
Gratification – 7.7 18.2 X 53.8 – – 53.8 27.3
Gratitude – – – – 7.7 – – 23.1 9.1
Remorse – 38.5 27.3 – 15.4 27.3 X 69.2 45.5
Anger – 23.1 9.1 – 46.2 9.1 – 7.7 9.1
predicted by the model. As it can be observed, the results
show no significant difference, with TBI patients performing
slightly better than controls. Participants were also asked to
pick out the emotions they would feel being in the characters’
shoes. Table 2 depicts percentages for emotion selection for the
Actor Studio testing methodology for both experimental groups.
The X indicates those emotions to be included in the agent’s
emotional state according to the MEA model. As Table 2 shows,
TBI participants tend to select a larger number of emotions in
every scenario.
Table 3 illustrates score means for the Actor Studio testing
methodology both for TBI participants and controls. We ran
Mann–Whitney statistic (p < 0.05) in order to compare
means; no statistically significant difference was found between
groups. However, there are some differences that deserve further
consideration: all scores are slightly higher for TBI patients
than controls (for Action Total Score, Emotion Total Score,
Moral Emotion Score, Non Moral Emotion Score), but at
the same time, their error scores (Error Total Score, Moral
Emotion Error Score, Non Moral Emotion Error Score) also
have higher values. In order to explore whether the observed
tendency of TBI participants to select a large number of (often
inconsistent) emotions would effect their scores, we measured
Simple Matching Coefficients. Before computing SMCs for each
scenario, we calculated the global SMC for all scenarios included
in the Actor Studio methodology, as we believed emotion choices
could be investigated as a single array of selected (and unselected)
emotion labels, to be compared with MEA model predictions.
When considering the complete emotion set, the mean SMC
was 0.71 for controls and 0.67 for TBI participants. Focusing on
moral emotions only, mean was 0.67 for TBI participants and
slightly higher (0.70) for controls. We compared SMC through
Mann-Whitney statistic. No statistically meaningful difference
was found for both global (U = 40.000; sig = 0.118) and
moral (U = 53.000; sig = 0.449) emotion set. SMCs were then
computed for each scenario separately and hence compared using
Mann–Whitney statistic (sig.< 0.05); no statistically significant
difference was found between groups. Table 4 shows Mann–
Whitney statistic for SMCs for the Actor Studio methodology.
SMCs were measured on the complete emotion set. Table 5
illustrates Mann-Whitney comparison on the SMCs of the two
groups, calculated on moral emotions only.
4.2.2. Results Audience
Due to methodology constraints (see section 3.3), data were
analyzed separately for each scenario. Subjects were asked
to select those emotions they believed better described the
emotional states of characters in the scenario. Tables 6, 7
illustrate percentages for emotion selection for the Audience
Studio test for both experimental groups. The X indicates those
emotions to be included in the agent’s emotional state according
to the MEA model. Percentages for the main character in the
scenario are shown in Table 6; percentages for the character
interacting with the protagonist are demonstrated in Table 7.
With respect to the results of the Actor Studio test (see previous
section, Table 2), the TBI patients’ tendency to select a larger
number of emotions here is more evident.
In order to better assess score differences for emotion
selection, Simple Matching Coefficients were computed for each
scenario for both TBI participants and controls: similarly to
the Actor Studio test, the SMCs are higher for controls than
TBI patients for all scenarios. SMCs (calculated considering the
complete emotion set) were then compared through Mann–
Whitney statistic (sig.<0.05).Table 8 illustrates results forMann-
Whitney comparison. Results for moral emotions are shown in
Table 9. In both cases, no significant differences were found.
5. DISCUSSION
In this work, the experiments described in section 3 were carried
out with a group of patients dealing with the consequences of
TBI and with a control group of neurologically intact individuals,
to explore group differences in the understanding of characters’
moral behavior and emotions. In fact, according to research, TBI
patients often exhibit impairments in social cognition, despite
undergoing effective rehabilitation. More precisely, our study
taps into the domain of moral emotion recognition in stories,
as an important yet often neglected (McDonald, 2013) aspect of
social cognition. Furthermore, our work contributes to research
on narrative understanding in brain damaged populations, as this
topic, to the best of our knowledge, has not been thoroughly
explored yet.
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TABLE 3 | Actor studio: mean scores.
Group ATS ETS MES N-MES ERTS MERS N-MERS
TBI 2.15 (0.081) 3.38 (0.768) 2.15 (0.081) 1.23 (2.934) 11.31 (2.934) 8.00 (2.160) 3.31 (1.109)
Controls 2.00 (0.632) 2.45 (2.067) 1.36 (1.567) 1.09 (0.831) 10.2 (2.832) 7.64 (2.111) 2.64 (1.027)
TABLE 4 | Actor studio: simple matching coefficients (all emotions).
Scenario TBI Controls MW U sig. (2-tailed)
Wallace 0.76 0.82 67.500 0.811
At school! 0.57 0.60 66.000 0.743
A difficult choice 0.64 0.65 65.000 0.700
TABLE 5 | Actor studio: simple matching coefficients (moral emotions).
Scenario TBI CONTROLS MW U Sig. (2-tailed)
Wallace 0.75 0.77 62.000 0.826
At school! 0.59 0.59 71.000 0.976
A difficult choice 0.66 0.69 67.5000 0.811
5.1. Group Differences
Emerging differences, although not significant, show a clear
trend and provide useful insight on the underpinnings of the
impairment in TBI individuals and on the use of emotional
virtual agents for rehabilitation. We first measured percentages
for both action and emotion choice for each scenario for
the Actor Studio methodology. After this, participants’ choices
were transformed into scores, to allow group comparisons.
Concerning Action choice, TBI participants performed slightly
better than controls, specially in the first scenario (see Table 1).
Nonetheless, these results came as no surprise, as controls
had to become confident with the procedure by themselves,
whereas TBI patients participated in the study with the help
of the experimenter. We believe randomized scenarios would
be necessary for future work. Despite this, Mann–Whitney
testing revealed no significant difference between groups (sig.
= 0.494). Emotion scores (both moral and non-moral) are
higher for the clinical sample: although unexpected (according
to our hypothesis), this can be explained by observing error
scores. As the testing methodology required participants to pick
out emotions from a list and emotion scores were computed
assigning 1 for each correct emotion, those being unselective (i.e.,
picking out a large number of emotions, although inconsistent)
could have indeed scored higher, as their probability to guess the
correct emotion was increased. In fact, for both moral and non-
moral emotions, error scores are lower for controls, suggesting a
link between TBI patients’ better performance and their tendency
to be unselective when judging emotions (as percentages for
emotion choice demonstrate).
Moreover, we observed the results obtained by measuring
the Simple Matching Coefficient (SMC) for each scenario and
for the Actor Studio methodology as a whole (see Tables 4, 5).
In fact, although it helps explaining group differences, error
score fails in providing thorough information on the mismatch
(or accordance) between the agent model and participants’
expectations. SMC, on the other hand, allowmeasuring similarity
between the agent model and participants’ expectations more
completely. We then compared SMCs through Mann–Whitney
statistics. Mann-Whitney testing has shown no statistically
significant difference for both complete and moral-only emotion
set (U = 40, sig. = 0.118; U = 53, sig. = 0.449). Interestingly,
we found a pattern in means for SMCs: although Mann-
Whitney statistic did not show any significant difference, controls
performed better than TBI participants for each scenario. It
has to be noticed that the protocol required TBI participants
to be not impaired in their ability to read and understand the
narrative content of the stories, along with having acceptable
attention span and visual abilities. As they did not differ in their
understanding of the narrative content of the stories, we believe
the SMC pattern we found (with TBI participants’ SMC being
lower than controls’ for each scenario) might be ascribed to a
specific impairment for the emotional content of the scenarios.
As the slight differences we found seemed specific for emotion
tasks, we think the action choice, where participants had to
guess the course of action characters would choose according
to their moral values, leverages reasoning abilities rather than
emotional skills.
We further analyzed how participants evaluated characters’
emotions. Regarding this, results for the Audience Studio testing
methodology might help explain the score difference found for
the Actor Studio methodology. As Tables 6, 7 show, TBI patients
often selected the correct emotion, although percentages for the
emotion predicted by the model were mostly higher for controls.
Nevertheless, what the results for the Audience Studio help
illustrate, is the fact that TBI participants tended to be unselective
toward emotions, seeming somewhat puzzled from the task.
For instance, in “The Count of Montecristo” all emotions were
selected at least once by TBI participants, in some cases strongly
inconsistently with MEA model predictions. Although the same
situation, according to appraisal theories, can be appraised
from different perspectives, resulting in different emotions to
be generated for the same situation, some possibilities are ruled
out by the model of emotional appraisal embedded in the agent.
Finally, we compared group means of the Simple Matching
coefficients for each scenario, using Mann-Whitney statistic. We
found no statistically significant difference (see Tables 8, 9), both
for complete and moral emotion sets. Further research may help
outline dissimilarities between TBI patients and healthy controls;
to do so, however, larger samples are needed.
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TABLE 6 | Audience studio: percentages for emotion choice (Main character).
Hamlet The count of MonteCristo Thérése Raquin The vicomte of bragelonne
Emotion MEA TBI C MEA TBI C MEA TBI C MEA TBI C
admiration – – 10.0% – 21.4% 37.5% – – – – 46.2% 30.0%
reproach X 46.7% 50.0% – 28.6% 25.0% – 30.8% 11.1% – 7.7% –
joy – – – X 35.7% 50.0% – – 11.1% – 53.8% 70.0%
gratification – – 10.0% X 42.9% 87.5% – – 11.1% X 69.2% 60.0%
gratitude – – 20.0% – 7.1% – – – – – 7.7% –
pride – – 10.0% X 71.4% 75.0% – 7.7% 11.1% – 53.8% 60.0%
fear – 13.3% 10.0% – 21.4% – – 46.2% 55.6% – 23.1% 10.0%
anger X 100% 30.0% – 28.6% 25.0% – 30.8% – – – –
remorse – 6.7% 10.0% – 14.3% – X 76.9% 88.9% – 15.4% –
hope – 0.0% 10.0% – 35.7% – – 15.4% – – 46.2% 30.0%
distress X 80.0% 30.0% – 14.3% – X 69.2 44.4 – 15.4 % –
shame – 33.3% – – 14.3% – X 76.9 77.8 – 15.4 % 10.0%
TABLE 7 | Audience studio: percentages for emotion choice (other character).
Hamlet The Count of MonteCristo Thérése Raquin The Vicomte of Bragelonne
TBI C (%) MEA (%) TBI C (%) MEA Emotion (%) TBI C (%) MEA (%) TBI C (%)
Admiration – – – – – – – – – – 46.2 60.0
Reproach - 20.0 20.0 – 35.7 – – 30.8 33.3 – – –
Joy – – – – – – – – 11.1 – 76.9 60.0
Gratification – – – – – – – – 11.1 – 30.8 10.0
Gratitude – – – – – – – 7.7 – X 84.6 60.0
Pride – 6.7 – – 7.1 – – 7.7 – – 15.4 –
Fear – 26.7 50.0 – 78.6 50.0 – 38.5 33.3 – 15.4 –
Anger – 33.3 – – 28.6 50.0 – 46.2 33.3 – 15.4 10.0
Remorse – 53.3 40.0 – 57.1 25.0 X 76.9 55.6 – 7.7 10.0
Hope – 6.7 20.0 – – – – – 15.4 – – 38.5 30.0
Distress – 73.3 10.0 X 42.9 37.5 X 23.1 66.7 – 23.1 –
Shame X 86.7 50.0 – 57.1 62.5 X 84.6 66.7 – 23.1 –
TABLE 8 | Audience studio: simple matching coefficients (global emotion set).
Scenario Mann–Whitney U Sig. (two-tailed)
Hamlet 53.000 0.210
The Count of MonteCrist 45.000 0.449
Thérèse Raquin 53.000 0.711
The Vicomte of Bragelonne 49.500 0.542
5.2. Moral Emotion Understanding in
Stories After TBI
Whereas not many works have addressed moral understanding
in stories, literature (Greene and Haidt, 2002; Ciaramelli et al.,
2007; Greene, 2015) illustrates how brain damaged individuals
differ from neurologically intact participants for moral personal
dilemmas. Personal moral dilemmas are dilemmas that elicit
emotional responses while evaluating the dilemma, whereas
non-personal and non moral dilemmas trigger no emotional
response. When facing a moral personal dilemma, TBI
participants differ from controls whilst they don’t seem to
differ when the dilemma elicits no emotion. According to
Greene and Haidt (2002) personal moral dilemmas activate
medial front gyrus, superior frontal gyrus while non-personal
moral dilemmas engage dorsolateral and prefrontal areas; the
same pattern can be observed when evaluating non-moral
dilemmas. As Moretti et al. (2009) point out, TBI individuals
whose brain damage involves areas such as the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex can perform moral judgments (in terms
of right/wrong), but show impairments in the emotional
counterpart, in what is often referred to as “moral emotions
selective impairment.” Furthermore, Hutcherson et al. (2015)
illustrated the interplay between utilitarian and emotional
appraisal during moral judgment based on moral values:
utilitarian and emotional moral appraisals are computed
separately and later integrated in a moral value response.
Furthermore, TBI individuals seem to exhibit a particularly
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TABLE 9 | Audience studio: simple matching coefficients (moral emotion set).
Scenario Mann–Whitney U Sig. (two-tailed)
Hamlet 55.500 0.262
The Count of MonteCrist 35.500 0.156
Thérèse Raquin 53.500 0.733
The Vicomte of Bragelonne 55.500 0.262
utilitarian pattern of judgments inmoral dilemmas (Rowley et al.,
2018). In our view, the emotional appraisal is the one of the
reasons behind the impaired performance we observed in TBI
patients, resulting in non standard moral judgments. Although
not significant, the “selective impairment” we found for the
emotional content of the scenarios might be attributed to the
aforementioned deficits.
5.3. Implications for Agent-Based
Rehabilitation
Taken altogether, our results further demonstrate the suitability
of the MEA model (Battaglino et al., 2013) for developing
emotional virtual agents and characters, and for their use in
rehabilitation. The difference we found is, in fact, what could
be predicted according to research on TBI participants, but also
what we could notice by interacting with them. For example, A’s
performance seems to be paradigmatic of the overall results we
found. A’s incident had occurred 10 years before the testing took
place, and she had spent 9 into rehabilitation. She was able to
read and understand the scenarios thoroughly and she was very
interested in and entertained by reasoning upon the emotional
content of the stories. When asked to predicted the characters’
action, she scored 2 out of 3, as most controls did, whereas
she only scored 3 out of 9 when asked about the emotions. As
she herself pointed out during the testing procedure, emotions
are the hardest part of her outcome, only understandable when
“black or white”; she perceives the gap between her current
limitations in dealing with emotions and her condition before
the trauma and would like to regain her full capability to
understand emotions.
We also had the goal to collect preliminary data for the
development of a rehabilitative tool in which patients face amoral
situation, addressing their ability to perform moral reasoning
and reasoning on their moral emotions through a virtual agent,
following the paradigm discussed in Lisetti and Hudlicka (2014)
and Hudlicka (2016). We investigated the correlation between
the SMCs of the emotions selected by the TBI patients in the
Actor Studio test and the rehabilitation duration or the time
distance since the trauma. Remember that, as described in
section 4, we leveraged SMCs to evaluate the similarity of the
emotions selected by the patients for each character with respect
to the predictions established by the MEA agent. We performed
Spearman correlation on SMCs of the patients in the Actor Studio
test and the duration of the rehabilitation (in years), finding no
meaningful correlation (r =−0.001 p = 0.996; two-tailed). As the
rehabilitation the patients were undergoing did not includemoral
emotions or moral scenarios, this result came as no surprise.
Similarly, we found Simple Matching Coefficients to be unrelated
to time distance as well (r = 0.125 p = 0.699; two tailed). In this,
the results obtained were promising for the design of agent-based
rehabilitation tools, since they show that, in the absence of a
specific rehabilitation targeted on emotions, and moral emotions
in particular, no advancements are obtained.
On the one side, our experiments confirm the feasibility of this
type of rehabilitation, further demonstrated by the comments of
our TBI participants (already reported in Ceccaldi et al., 2016):
A—“this test allowed me to think about the values that shape
my moral judgment, helping me understand how every action
comes after deep and elaborate reasoning”; R—believes this test
“is important, as it makes my head start again.” On the other
side, the indirect validation of the MEA model provided by the
study opens the way to the use of virtual agents in rehabilitative
settings, as it contributes to the specification of an accountable
agent model for developing practical applications.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we described and discussed the results of the
experiments on emotion understanding in stories that we
conducted on a group TBI patients by leveraging a moral
emotional agent. In brief, taking the agent model as a reference,
we compared emotion recognition in TBI individuals and in a
control group of neurologically intact participants. The results
show that, notwithstanding no statistically meaningful difference
between the two groups, the performance of the TBI patients
differed from the control group concerning moral emotions.
The main finding of our work was that the difference between
the two groups was far from significant for those dimensions
pertaining to the characters’ course of action, whereas scores
were higher for controls than for TBI participants for each
scenario and for both test types. TBI participants performed
differently from controls when asked to evaluate the emotional
content of narrative scenarios. A complete and thorough
definition of all the features that differentiate impaired moral
and non-moral emotion understanding in people who suffered
from TBI from that of healthy controls is far from achieved.
Nonetheless, our results demonstrate the need to focus on
emotion processing (rather than on reasoning) in order to
gain a deeper understanding. This is in line with the mental
models theory perspective on moral reasoning (Bucciarelli et al.,
2008). More precisely, according to this perspective, moral
reasoning is regular reasoning that happens to concern moral
issues. The TBI patients included in our study were in a late
stage of their rehabilitation; as a consequence, their reasoning
could be compared to those of neurologically intact individuals.
Despite this, their performance varied more significantly from
that of controls for those tasks requiring (moral or non-moral)
emotional processing. In our opinion, having patients whose
outcome is similar to our participants’ interacting with virtual
characters whose emotional state holds a moral component could
be effective in helping these patients improve their emotional
moral functioning and their understanding of moral (but also
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non-moral) emotions in characters. Conversely, we believe
also that modeling “impaired” moral characters would provide
effective and useful agent-based rehabilitative applications and
more engaging virtual environments.
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